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CRIMINAL LAW-DISCOVERY-TEST FOR MATERIALITY OF
UNDISCLOSED IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
United States v. Pflaumer (1985)
The right to a fair trial is deeply rooted in the constitutional right
not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
laws guaranteed by the fifth amendment.' In order to assure this right,
the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland2 held that "sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." '3 This duty imposed upon the prosecution in a criminal
1. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides in perti-
nent part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the defendant and a companion were
found guilty of first-degree murder at separate trials. Id. at 85. Both parties
were sentenced to death. Id. At Brady's trial, he admitted to his participation in
the killing, but claimed that his companion did the actual killing, and Brady
should therefore be spared the death penalty. Id. Brady's counsel requested of
the prosecution the production of any extrajudicial statements in its possession
that were made by Brady's accomplice. Id. The prosecution failed to disclose to
the defendant's counsel one statement by the defendant's accomplice in which
the accomplice admitted to committing the actual physical killing which led to
Brady's first-degree murder conviction. Id. See generally Babcock, Fair Play: Evi-
dence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133
(1982); Note, Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Unrequested Impeachment Evidence: The
Fifth Circuit's Approach, 61 WASH. U.L.Q 163 (1983).
3. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeals of
Maryland's holding that the failure to disclose the specifically requested material
violated Brady's constitutional right to due process, and that he was thus enti-
tled to a new sentencing hearing. Id. The Court further held that the violation
of due process did not affect his guilt or innocence of the crime because he
admitted participation in the act. Therefore, he was not entitled to a new trial
for the determination of his guilt or innocence on the merits of the case. Id.
The Court relied on two Third Circuit cases in its determination of a consti-
tutional violation for failure to disclose requested material. Id. at 86. In United
States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, the Third Circuit held that "suppression of evidence
favorable" to a criminal defendant was enough to constitute a denial of due pro-
cess when the prosecution withheld otherwise admissible evidence that could
have persuaded the jury to impose a lighter sentence. 195 F.2d 815, 817-20 (3d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953). The court in Baldi seemed to say
that the appropriate standard of a deprivation of rights to due process is
whether the evidence would have been admissible had it been disclosed. Id. at
819.
In United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, the Third Circuit held that "[t]he sup-
pression of evidence may be a denial of due process when it is vital evidence,
material to the issues of guilt or penalty." 221 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1955)
(quoting United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert.
(1142)
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case to disclose "Brady material" has raised serious questions as to the
scope of this duty and the effect of the duty upon the adversarial pro-
cess. 4 The well-known language quoted above has provided only gen-
eral guidance to many courts, leaving open serious questions such as the
appropriate standard for determining materiality,5 whether this stan-
dard should change depending upon the nature of the request, if any,
made by the defense counsel, 6 and the applicability of the rule to im-
peachment evidence.
7
denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953)), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955). The Dye court
granted a new trial, finding that the suppressed evidence was vital to issues of
guilt or penalty, because its disclosure "could" have resulted in a finding of sec-
ond-degree murder instead of first-degree murder, or life imprisonment instead
of the death penalty. 221 F.2d at 767.
4. The likely effect of the Brady case at the time it was decided was to force
prosecutors to carefully scan their files and hand over to the defense all informa-
tion relevant to the case in order to avoid a constitutional violation and reversal
of a conviction. Babcock, supra note 2, at 1135. Conceivably, this would change
the prosecutor's role from an adversary to that of a neutral fact-finder, thus in-
fringing upon the adversarial system so coveted in Anglo-American systems. Id.
For a general discussion of the goals of the adversarial system, as well as the
constraints placed upon that system, see id.
5. Immediately following Brady, most circuit courts followed the Third Cir-
cuit cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, and held that
undisclosed evidence is material if it was relevant and could have changed the
jury verdict. See, e.g., Ogden v. Wolff, 522 F.2d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 1975) (undis-
closed evidence is material if there is significant chance that it would have cre-
ated reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v.
McCrane, 527 F.2d 906, 911 (3d Cir. 1975) (material if reasonably likely to
change jury's judgment), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976), vacated and remanded,
427 U.S. 909 (1977); Clay v. Black, 479 F.2d 319, 320 (6th Cir. 1973) (informa-
tion is material if it could have raised serious doubts in mind ofjurors); Levin v.
Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (material if might have led jury
to entertain reasonable doubt). For a discussion of the Third Circuit cases relied
upon by the Supreme Court in the Brady decision, see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text.
6. The Supreme Court spoke on the issue of materiality in situations where
the defense has made only a general request for information, or no request at
all, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). For a complete discussion of
Agurs, see infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
7. See United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). In Bagley, the
Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit determination that the failure to dis-
close impeachment evidence is "even more egregious" than other exculpatory
evidence, and held that there is no distinction between impeachment and other
exculpatory evidence for purposes of determining the materiality of such evi-
dence. Id. at 3381.
Prior to the Supreme Court's conclusive ruling as to the materiality of im-
peachment evidence, the Third Circuit held that impeachment evidence was at
most as equally egregious as other exculpatory evidence, and in many circum-
stances less egregious than exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Mc-
Crane, 547 F.2d 204, 205 (3d Cir. 1976) (expressing some doubt as to
applicability of Agurs materiality standard since concern in McCrane was over im-
peachment evidence).
Other circuits seemed to have been in line with the Third Circuit. See, e.g.,
United States v. Imbruglia, 617 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1980) (expressing uncertainty
2
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The Supreme Court attempted to shed light on these questions in
United States v. Agurs.8 In Agurs, the Court delineated three different non-
disclosure situations, and specified a standard of materiality for each sit-
uation. The Agurs Court suggested that when the prosecution fails to
disclose specifically requested evidence, a constitutional violation exists
if there is a substantial basis for claiming materiality. 9 The second situa-
tion discussed in Agurs occurs when the prosecution fails to disclose evi-
dence that would demonstrate the use of perjured testimony in the
prosecution's case. 10 The standard of materiality in this type of situa-
tion is very strict. A constitutional error exists "if there is any reason-
able likelihood that the false testimony could have affected thejudgment
of the jury.""Il Finally, the Agurs Court addressed the situation illus-
trated by its own facts. In cases in which no request or merely a general
about applying the Agurs materiality test to impeachment evidence); United
States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor has greater duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence than purely impeachment evidence), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 818 (1978). But see, e.g., Ruiz v. Cady, 635 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Agurs reasoning is equally applicable to impeachment and exculpatory evi-
dence); United States ex rel. Annunziato v. Manson, 425 F. Supp. 1272 (D.
Conn.), aft'd, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1977) (no distinction between impeachment
and exculpatory evidence).
8. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs, the defendant was convicted of second-
degree murder for the stabbing of James Sewell. Id. The defendant claimed
self-defense. Id. Defense counsel made no request for exculpatory or impeach-
ment evidence, and the prosecution failed to disclose evidence of the victim's
prior convictions of offenses involving knives, information which would have
helped the defendant's self-defense claim. Id. at 99-101.
9. Id. at 104-05. The Court went on to say that "when the prosecutor re-
ceives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is sel-
dom, if ever, excusable." Id.
The language in Agurs referring to specific request situations is arguably
dicta since Agurs itself was not a specific request case. Nonetheless, it has been
adopted by the lower courts as the appropriate standard for determining materi-
ality in specific request cases, mostly because it does not greatly depart from any
previously applied standard. See, e.g., Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir.) (evidence is material if it might affect the jury's determination), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 877 (1980); United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981); United States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d
730, 736 (3d Cir. 1978) (Agurs test is "whether the suppressed evidence might
have affected the outcome of the trial"); see also United States v. Starusko, 729
F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1984) (determining prior to trial that impeachment evidence
was material, thus requiring disclosure); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 43
(3d Cir. 1983) (no denial of due process if disclosed in time for effective use at
trial), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048 (1984); DeMartino v. Weidenburner, 616 F.2d
708, 713 (3d Cir. 1980) (undisclosed statements that money was meant to retain
counsel and not as bribe is not material since record shows corroborating testi-
mony); United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that
undisclosed evidence creates substantial basis for claiming materiality).
10. 427 U.S. at 107.
11. 427 U.S. at 103. The Court relied upon Mooney v. Holohan as the lead-
ing case on issue of withholding evidence of perjured testimony. Id. (citing
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)). The Agurs Court determined that the
Court has consistently applied a strict standard of determining constitutional
1144 [Vol. 31: p. 1142
3
Schwartz: Criminal Law - Discovery - Test for Materiality of Undisclosed Im
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
request for exculpatory evidence is made, failure to disclose such evi-
dence will constitute a reversible constitutional error "if the omitted evi-
dence creates reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist."' 12
Apparently still concerned over the effect of the Brady/Agurs rule
upon the adversarial system and the confusion in the lower courts in
applying the three standards of materiality, the Supreme Court spoke
again on the issue of the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence to the
defense. In United States v. Bagley,' 3 the Supreme Court redefined what
constitutes material evidence for purposes of determining whether the
suppression of such evidence violates due process under the rule in
Brady. 14 In Bagley, the Court refused to recognize any difference be-
tween evidence that can potentially be used to impeach an incriminating
witness and any other type of exculpatory evidence.1 5 Furthermore, the
Bagley Court applied the new standard for the determination of material-
ity to all cases regardless of whether or not defense counsel had re-
quested the evidence. 16 According to Bagley, nondisclosed "evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."17
error in such cases. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
12. 427 U.S. at 112. The Court accordingly reversed the appellate court's
order of a new trial because based on the entire record, the trial judge "re-
mained convinced of respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 114.
13. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). In Bagley, the defendant was convicted on nar-
cotic charges. Id. at 3378. Subsequent to the trial, defense counsel learned that
the prosecution had an immunity agreement with an incriminating witness, but
failed to disclose such agreement to the defense, despite a specific request for
such agreements. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a
motion for a new trial on the ground that the failure to disclose constituted a
Brady violation, and held that a failure to disclose impeachment evidence called
for "automatic reversal." Id. at 3377. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that a new trial is warranted only if there is a reasonable probability that disclo-
sure would have led to a different verdict. Id. The Court defined a reasonable
probability as a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence of the verdict.
Id.
For a further discussion of Bagley and other circuit cases decided since Bag-
ley, see Casenote, Nondisclosure of Prosecutorial Evidence That Can be Used for Impeach-
ment Purposes is Constitutional Error Requiring Reversal if There is a Reasonable
Probability that the Outcome of the Trial is Affected, 17 ST. MARY's L. J. 1105 (1986).
14. For a discussion of Brady, see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text;
Babcock, supra note 2, at 1142-45; Note, supra note 2.
15. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3379. The Ninth Circuit had determined that im-
peachment evidence was to be awarded differently from other exculpatory evi-
dence, and that failure to disclose impeachment evidence therefore warranted
an automatic reversal. Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983),
rev'd, United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985).
16. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3385. This portion of the Bagley opinion effectively
incorporates the separate tests of materiality established in Agurs. For a further
discussion of the Agurs tests, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
17. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3384.
1986] 1145
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The Third Circuit was recently confronted with the task of applying
the new Bagley standard of materiality in United States v. Pflaumer,18 and
held that the undisclosed evidence was not material and did not warrant
a new trial. Defendant William H. Pflaumer was the sole stockholder of
Wm. H. P., Inc. (WHP), a trucking business with its principal operating
facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and with separate terminals lo-
cated in Maryland and New Jersey. 19 The Pflaumer case arose out of a
scheme involving agreements between WHP and three fuel companies,
Park Oil Co., United Fuel Oil and Burner Co. (United), and M &J Oil,20
designed to defraud the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of state fuel
excise taxes, and to obtain illegal road use credits from the states of
Maryland and New Jersey. 2 1 Each of these oil companies on different
occasions delivered oil to the WHP plant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
but falsified their delivery invoices to show that the oil had been deliv-
ered to WHP plants in either New Jersey or Maryland. 2 2 Thus, the
scheme avoided the more costly Pennsylvania state fuel excise tax and
provided a source for falsely claimed road use credits from Maryland
and New Jersey.25 WHP and each of the respective fuel oil companies
would then share in the money saved by the falsification of invoices and
filing of false tax returns. 24
18. 774 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d
1298 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub nom., United States v. Pflaumer, 105
S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
19. 774 F.2d at 1226. Working under Pflaumer were several individuals
allegedly involved in the scheme, including Charles Gillan, President of WHP;
Raymond Hill, manager of WHP's Philadelphia terminal; and Ralph Wille,
comptroller of the Philadelphia terminal. Id. at 1226-28.
20. 774 F.2d at 1226-28. Park Oil Company was owned by FrankJock. Id.
at 1227. United was owned by John Luciano. Id. at 1226. M & J Oil was a
company formed by FrankJock and his son, MichaelJock. Id. at 1227.
21. Id. at 1226.
22. Id.
23. Pennsylvania has a fuel excise tax of 9 cents per gallon and a road use
tax of the same rate. United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir.
1984), vacated and remanded sub nom., United States v. Pflaumer, 105 S. Ct. 3550
(1985). Taxpayers are permitted to offset any state fuel excise tax due against
the road use tax. Id. at 1300. Maryland and New Jersey have excise and road
use taxes similar to those in Pennsylvania; however, these states only charge at a
rate of 8 cents per gallon. Id.
24. 774 F.2d at 1226-28. The scheme began when FrankJock approached
Harold Oxman, a Park Oil salesman, with a plan designed to obtain WHP's fuel
oil business. Id. at 1226. Oxman arranged for a meeting between Jock,
Pflaumer and go-between John McCullough, former president of the roofer's
union. Id. Subsequent to this meeting, Park Oil began making deliveries pursu-
ant to the agreed upon plan. Id. At one point, according to Frank Jock's testi-
mony, Pflaumer became delinquent in his payments, and Jock discontinued to
pay the commission kickbacks. Id. At this time, Pflaumer met with John
Luciano, president of United, to discuss a similar arrangement. Id. Frank Jock
also informed WHP that he was forming a new fuel company, M &J Oil, with his
son Michael, and wanted WHP to give that company some business under the
same scheme. Id.
1146 [Vol. 31: p. 1142
5
Schwartz: Criminal Law - Discovery - Test for Materiality of Undisclosed Im
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Prior to the hearing on the indictments with respect to the
scheme,2 5 defense counsel specifically requested that the prosecutor
furnish the defense with all information relating to prosecution wit-
nesses, including any agreements they had with such witnesses. 2 6 The
prosecutors disclosed the fact that they had agreements with two co-
conspirators, FrankJock andJohn Luciano, who were to testify at trial in
exchange for preferential treatment and release from jail.2 7 However,
the prosecutors did not disclose the fact that they had an agreement with
Ralph Wille, the comptroller of WHP, whereby Wille had agreed to tes-
tify in exchange for immunity. 28 At trial in the Federal District Court for
25. Id. at 1226. William Pflaumer was indicted on 21 counts of mail fraud
and one count of conspiracy for his alleged involvement in the scheme. Id. Ray-
mond Hill, the manager of WHP's Philadelphia terminal, and Charles Gillan, the
president of WHP, were also indicted for their involvement in the aforemen-
tioned scheme. 740 F.2d at 1301. Harold Oxman, the salesman for Park Oil,
who allegedly used the scheme as a means of soliciting business from WHP was
also indicted. Id. Ralph Wille, WHP's comptroller was not indicted, nor was
coconspirator Frank Jock. Id.
26. Id. at 1228. See also Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1301.
27. 774 F.2d at 1228. The government disclosed prior criminal records
and the agreements with John Luciano and Frank Jock for certain preferential
treatment in exchange for "truthful cooperation." Id.
Frank Jock was an unindicted co-conspirator who was convicted of fraudu-
lent conduct unrelated to this trial. Id. at 1226-27. John Luciano pleaded guilty
to conspiracy and tax evasion for his involvement in the scheme. Id. at 1229.
28. The agreement between Ralph Wille and the prosecutor's office pro-
vided in pertinent part as follows:
September 26, 1980
Stephen A. Madva, Esquire
3 Parkway
20th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Re: Ralph P. Wilk
Dear Mr. Madva:
This letter will memorialize our understanding and agreement re-
garding the cooperation and testimony of Ralph P. Wille relative to the
federal investigation into certain activities of Charles Gillan and others during the
period between June 2, 1978 and December, 1979.
It is the understanding of the parties hereto that Ralph P. Wille is
prepared to cooperate with the United States Government with respect to
the above-mentioned investigation.
In exchange for Ralph P. Wille's complete cooperation and testi-
mony at any hearings and/or trials pertaining to the above-mentioned investi-
gation, the Government agrees that the information and testimony
provided by Ralph P. Wille will not be used against him in any criminal
prosecution, nor will any information or evidence derived from the in-
formation and testimony provided by Ralph P. Wille be utilized against
him in any criminal prosecution in this district.
It is agreed by Ralph P. Wille that under this agreement he is obli-
gating himself to provide truthful information and testimony, without
reservation, regarding any and all of the matters relating to the above-mentioned
investigation. As part of this understanding, Ralph P. wille will hold him-
self available for interviews with the Government, in addition to testify-
19861 1147
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2 9 the prosecutors developed exten-
sive testimony unveiling the scheme.30 Frank Jock testified that he pro-
posed the scheme to Park Oil salesman, Harold Oxman, who arranged
for a meeting with William Pflaumer.3 t Jock further testified that the
meeting took place and Pflaumer agreed to the scheme.3 2 John
Luciano, president of United, testified that he met with Pflaumer to dis-
cuss a similar arrangement with his fuel company.3 3 Ralph Wille, the
comptroller of WHP, testified to the fact that William Pflaumer had an
active role in WHP's financial affairs. 34 Wille also testified that
Pflaumer's "primary interest was in the operation of the brewery,
Schmidt's brewery." '3 5
William Pflaumer's primary defense was that while he was aware
that the scheme took place, he was divorced from the management and
daily operations of WHP.3 6 William Pflaumer's defense counsel cross-
examined both co-conspirators, Jock and Luciano, intensely, with the in-
tent to impeach their credibility by implying that their motive for impli-
cating Pflaumer in the crimes was based on their own concerns for
ing at any other hearing or trial proceedings when called upon to do so
by the Government.
Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1301-02 n.3 (emphasis supplied by court).
29. 774 F.2d at 1226. Co-defendants at the trial were Harold Oxman, Ray-
mond Hill and William Pflaumer. Id. Their defense acknowledged the existence
of the scheme, but denied participation, attributing most of the blame to Charles
Gillan and John Luciano who pleaded guilty to the charges brought against
them. Id.
30. Id. at 1226-31. Included in the list of those who testified were William
Holton, WHP's former accountant; a Pennsylvania tax auditor; Michael Jock;
Frank Jock; John Luciano; and Ralph Wille. Id.
31. Id. at 1227.
32. Id. The agreement reached by the participants "was that 7 of the 13
cents a gallon saved through fuel tax fraud would go to Pflaumer, 4 cents would
go toJock, and 2 cents would be divided between Oxman and McCullough." Id.
The agreement was disclosed to WHP President Charles Gillan so that he could
work out billing particulars. Id.
33. Id. Luciano also testified that he met with Raymond Hill to discuss de-
livery of the fuel and particulars of the scheme. Id.
34. Id. at 1228. Wille testified that Pflaumer "pretty much directed the
company .... [f]rom the financial end." Id. Wille directly implicated Gillan
(and not Pflaumer) in the tax fraud scheme. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. This defense was partially corroborated by the testimony of Ralph
Wille who stated that Gillan was responsible for the day-to-day operations of
WHP. Id. In addition, Pflaumer's defense was based on the testimony of three
witnesses. Id. Jacqueline Branson, his secretary, testified that she observed part
of the meeting that FrankJock testified about, and that the meeting pertained to
Jock's interest in supplying oil to WHP. Id. On cross-examination, she testified
that she was not at the table with the men during the meeting, and she received
many phone calls. Id. William T. Elliot, the president of Schmidt's Brewery,
testified that Pflaumer spent all his time running the brewery. Id. at 1229. Co-
defendant, Raymond Hill, testified that Gillan was the "active figure in WHP's
affairs." Id.
1148
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preferential treatment.3 7 The defense did not attempt to impeach the
testimony of Ralph Wille.a
8
The jury convicted Pflaumer of all twenty-one counts of mail fraud,
and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud.3 9 Subsequent to the
convictions, Pflaumer's counsel learned of the agreement between
Ralph Wille and the prosecution, and filed a motion for a new trial on
several grounds, including the ground that the prosecution's failure to
disclose the suppressed agreement was a violation of due process.
40
The district court denied this motion.
4 1
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Judge Gibbons, writing for a major-
ity of the court held that a Brady violation did exist, and the defendant
Pflaumer was entitled to a new trial. 4 2 In reaching its decision, the
Third Circuit applied the test set out in Brady43 and Agurs.4 4 The court
37. Id.
38. Id. In fact, Pflaumer's counsel relied on and emphasized Wille's testi-
mony to support the defense's theory that Gillan, not Pflaumer, was the respon-
sible party. Id.
39. Id. The conviction was for mail fraud because the scheme called for the
mailing of underreported state fuel excise taxes to Pennsylvania, and the mailing
of false claims for road use credits to Maryland and New Jersey. Id. at 1226.
Harold Oxman was also convicted of 21 counts of mail fraud, and one count
of conspiracy. Id. at 1229. Raymond Hill, the Philadelphia terminal manager of
WHP, was acquitted of all charges. Id.
40. 740 F.2d at 1313. The motion for a new trial was based upon four sepa-
rate grounds: first, the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of the witnesses,
with whom agreements were made, during trial and in the closing argument;
second, the trial court refused to admit certain evidence; third, the trial court
gave improper jury instructions pertaining to the conspiracy charge; and fourth,
the prosecutor failed to disclose the agreement with Wille to the defending
party. Id. at 1302-06. This casebrief will primarily deal with the final argument
involving an alleged violation of the principle set forth in Brady, that the prose-
cution's failure to disclose material evidence which is requested by the defense
constitutes a violation of due process. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Babcock,
supra note 2, at 1142-45.
41. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1300. The district court, in denying the new trial
motion, focused on the reasonable probability that, had the agreement with
Wille been disclosed, the jury verdict would have been different. Pflaumer, 774
F.2d at 1230.
42. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1300. The Third Circuit held that William
Pflaumer's rights to due process were violated when the prosecution failed to
disclose the immunity agreement between the prosecution and Ralph Wille be-
cause the defense had a substantial basis for claiming materiality of that evi-
dence, and failure to disclose was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 1313-19.
43. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1308-09. The Brady case is the leading case dealing
with a defendant's due process rights during pretrial discovery. Under Brady,
any suppression by the prosecution of material, requested evidence violates due
process. Id. For a further discussion of Brady, see supra notes 2-7 and accompa-
nying text.
44. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1300-10. In Agurs, the Court rejected the part of
Brady which requires that evidence be requested. Id. Instead, the Court re-
garded the fact that evidence is or is not requested as a factor in determining
materiality. Id. The Agurs Court noted that if a specific request had been made,
1986] 1149
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concluded that the prosecution's failure to disclose impeachment infor-
mation which is specifically requested by the defense violates the test set
out in Agurs when, viewed from the prosecution's position at the time of
the request, the witness' testimony incriminates the defendant, the re-
quested information significantly impairs the incriminatory character of
the testimony, and the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.4 5 Judge Sloviter vigorously dissented, arguing that the majority
had imposed a per se standard of materiality, and finding the undisclosed
evidence to be immaterial under the Agurs standard.4 6 Upon the grant-
ing of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the holding of the Third
Circuit and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bagley, the
Supreme Court's most recent statement on the materiality standard
nondisclosure of the requested evidence would constitute a violation of the
Brady rule if a "substantial basis for claiming materiality exists." Id. For a fur-
ther discussion of Agurs, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
45. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1313. In the majority opinion,Judge Gibbons inter-
preted the Agurs test for determining the materiality of specifically requested
material to be measured prospectively, from the prosecutor's point of view prior
to trial (i.e., when the material is requested). Id. The majority refused to specu-
late retrospectively as to whether the defense would have had a substantial basis
for claiming materiality of the undisclosed information. Id.
Once the majority determined the standard to be used, there remained only
the determinations of whether Ralph Wille incriminated any of the defendants
through his testimony, whether the undisclosed information could possibly im-
peach Wille, and whether this failure to disclose was harmless. Id. at 1314.
Judge Gibbons reached affirmative answers with relative ease as to the first
two questions. Id. As to the first, the court found that Wille's testimony rebut-
ted one of Pflaumer's principal defenses and was, thus, incriminatory. Id. at
1316. As to the second, the court reasoned that the undisclosed impeachment
evidence, which would have indicated that substantial benefits had been con-
ferred on all the government's witnesses in exchange for their testimony, may
have led the jury to doubt the veracity of the government's case against
Pflaumer. Id. at 1317. As to the third question, Judge Gibbons applied the
harmless error test established by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California.
Id. at 1317 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). Under the Chap-
man rule, a constitutional error does not warrant a new trial if the prosecution
can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Chapman, 386
U.S. at 24. Judge Gibbons determined that the prosecution failed to meet this
burden, and thus a new trial was necessary. 740 F.2d at 1319.
46. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1319 (Sloviter,J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter's dis-
senting opinion primarily disagreed with the majority's application of the Agurs
materiality test for specifically requested impeachment information. Id. at 1320
(Sloviter,J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority did not apply the
correct test for determining materiality set out in Agurs. Id. The dissent claimed
that the test applied by the majority was to be used in situations in which the
prosecutor used testimony which he knew or should have known was perjured.
Id. at 1319-20 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Under that test, the information is
deemed material "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of thejury." Id. (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103).
The dissent argued that by applying this test to specifically requested impeach-
ment evidence, even though it was intended by the court to be applied only in
regard to the prosecutor's use of perjured testimony, the majority created a per se
materiality rule for such evidence. Id. at 1320 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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originally set forth in Brady.4 7
Against this background, the Third Circuit, on remand, in United
States v. Pflaumer, once again addressed the issue of whether a prosecu-
tor's failure to disclose an immunity agreement of a government witness
constituted material evidence for the purposes of determining whether
the suppression of such evidence violates due process under the rule
established in Brady.4 8 Judge Sloviter, writing for the majority of the
court,49 began by reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in Bagley.5 0
The Third Circuit indicated that the Supreme Court in Bagley reformu-
lated the standard of materiality applicable to nondisclosed evidence by
stating that "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." 5 1 Under this analysis a "rea-
sonable probability" is defined as a "probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."'5 2
The Third Circuit indicated that the test for materiality set forth in
Bagley was significantly different from the test for materiality developed
in Agurs, which the Third Circuit had applied upon first hearing the
case.53 Therefore, Judge Sloviter concluded that the court must deter-
47. United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). For a further discus-
sion of Bagley, see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
48. The court also addressed the issue of whether jury instructions regard-
ing defendant Pflaumer's conviction for conspiracy to commit mail fraud were
improper and warranted a new trial. 774 F.2d at 1231-34. The court concluded
that any defect in the jury instructions applied only to the count against
Pflaumer regarding conspiracy to commit mail fraud and did not affect the sub-
stantial mail fraud counts. Id. Thus, the sole basis for granting a new trial to
Pflaumer with regard to the substantive mail fraud counts rested on the court's
determination of the effect of the undisclosed Brady material. Id.
49. Id. at 1234. Judge Sloviter, the author of the dissent in Oxman, authored
the majority opinion in Pflaumer, and Judge Gibbons, the majority author in
Oxman, now dissents. Thus, reconsideration in light of the Bagley decision did
not change the positions of either of these judges, but the Bagley decision was
enough to sway the position of District Judge Mencer, so as to give Judge
Sloviter the majority in Pflaumer. While Judge Mencer provided the sway vote in
both opinions, he did not write an opinion to justify his reasoning for changing
his vote apparently in light of Bagley.
50. 774 F.2d at 1225-26. For a discussion of the facts of Bagley, see supra
notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 1226 (quoting Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3385). Judge Sloviter recog-
nized that in creating such a definition the Supreme Court rejected any distinc-
tion between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence for purposes of
the Brady rule. 774 F.2d at 1226.
52. Id. (quoting Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3385).
53. 774 F.2d at 1226. When the court decided the case the first time, it
applied the standard of materiality in specific request cases set forth in Agurs, i.e.,
whether a "substantial basis for claiming materiality existed," and applied the
Third Circuit's interpretation of Agurs which looks at whether the outcome of the
trial could have been different. Id. at 1225-26. For a further discussion of the
standards of materiality set forth in Agurs, and the Third Circuit's interpretation
thereof, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
19861 1151
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mine whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome could
have been different had the prosecution disclosed Ralph Wille's immu-
nity agreement. 54 Thus, according to Judge Sloviter, the ultimate issue
in the case was the effectiveness of Ralph Wille's testimony as to William
Pflaumer's participation in WHP's financial affairs. 55 Following this
analysis, Judge Sloviter stated that the court must consider the conten-
tions of the parties while first, reviewing the findings of the district
court, and second, reexamining the record in the case. 56
Upon review of the facts of the case, Judge Sloviter reviewed the
findings of the district court. 57 According to the Third Circuit, the dis-
trict court expressed the standard of materiality as whether the sup-
pressed evidence "might have" affected the outcome of the trial.58 The
court emphasized that such a test would be improper under Bagley.59
However, in its application of the test, the district court correctly fo-
cused on the reasonable probability that had the immunity agreement
been disclosed, the result would have been different. 60 The court then
concluded that, because the district court applied the correct test, 6 1 the
result of its weighing of the evidence merited deference from the court
of appeals. 62
Judge Sloviter then continued by emphasizing that even a com-
pletely independent review of the record would result in the same con-
clusion reached by the district court.6 3 Judge Sloviter came to this
conclusion first by examining Ralph Wille's testimony. Ralph Wille's
testimony evidenced William Pflaumer's active role in the affairs of WHP
and was, therefore, important to the prosecution's case both in proving
Pflaumer's participation in the illegal acts, as well as in disproving
Pflaumer's principal defense that he had no knowledge of, nor was he
54. 774 F.2d at 1226.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1229.
58. Id.
59. Judge Sloviter stated that in Bagley, the Supreme Court expressly found
such an inquiry insufficient "because it does not indicate what quantum of likeli-
hood there must be that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the out-
come." Id. (quoting Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3383 n.12).
60. 774 F.2d at 1230. The district court examined the testimony of Frank
Jock, John Luciano, and Ralph Wille and concluded that "even if the defendants
had been able to impeach Wille by virtue of the immunity agreement, there was
sufficient other evidence implicating Mr. Pflaumer." Id. (citation omitted).
Judge Sloviter determined this reference to the cumulative effect of the evidence
presented by the prosecution to be a defacto application of the Bagley standard.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114). Judge Sloviter found that this defer-
ence to the district court finding was important especially in this case due to the
inherent difficulty of measuring "the effect of a nondisclosure on the course of a
lengthy trial covering many witnesses and exhibits." Id. at 1230.
63. Id.
1152 [Vol. 31: p. 1142
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involved in, the illegal affairs of WHP.6 4 However, this testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of WHP's accountant, 6 5 a tax auditor,6 6
and alleged co-conspirators, 67 all of whom testified as to Pflaumer's role
in the scheme. Further, WHP's office manager testified that Pflaumer
was involved in the "financial end of the business,"'68 which was the
most valuable part of Ralph Wille's testimony.69 Judge Sloviter also
found it significant that the prosecution had not mentioned Ralph
Wille's testimony in its closing argument, 70 inferring that the prosecu-
tion did not see his testimony as significant.
As a result of Judge Sloviter's independent review of the signifi-
cance of Ralph Wille's testimony, the Third Circuit concluded that there
was not a reasonable probability that the result of this trial would have
been different had the defense been provided with the opportunity to
impeach Ralph Wille on the basis of his immunity agreement with the
government. 7 1 However, Judge Sloviter pointed out in her conclusion
that the prosecution's failure to disclose immunity agreements may
have, under different facts, led to a "subversion of the defendant's due
process rights."7 2 In such a case, the failure to disclose requested Brady
material would have resulted in the conclusion that confidence in the
verdict was undermined. 73
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Gibbons, expressed both
distaste and confusion with the Supreme Court's disposition of the
case 7 4 and disagreement with the majority's application of the Bagley
64. Id. at 1228. "Wille testified that Pflaumer was aware of all checks paid
and 'pretty much directed the company .... [f]rom the financial end.'" Id. He
also testified, however, that Pflaumer's "primary interest" was in the brewery.
Id. Such evidence clearly supported Pflaumer's theory of defense. For a further
discussion of the testimony against William Pflaumer, see supra notes 29-34 and
accompanying text.
. 65. Id. at 1227. William Holton testified to the fact that he had requested
Pflaumer's signature on some falsified tax returns.
66. Id. The tax auditor testified that he requested of Pflaumer, and was
denied, the production of WHP fuel tax invoices. Id. The government also in-
troduced into evidence false returns signed by Pflaumer which were later pro-
duced as a result of a federal grand jury subpoena. Id. at 1228.
67. Id. at 1226-27. For a further discussion of the testimony of the co-con-
spirators, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
68. 774 F.2d at 1228.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1230. Judge Sloviter relied on the cumulative evidence presented
against William Pflaumer, the failure of the prosecution to use Ralph Wille's
testimony in its closing argument, and defense counsel's use of Wille's testi-
mony in support of its own theory when making an independent review of the
district court's opinion. Id.
71. Id. The court held that "the government's failure to disclose the immu-
nity agreement, in the context of the facts and full record of this case does not
undermine our confidence in the verdict." Id.
72. Id. at 1231.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1234 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The Gibbons dissent expressed
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test. 75 Judge Gibbons began by recapitulating his analysis under the
Agurs test of materiality of specifically requested information. 76 Accord-
ing to Judge Gibbons, the Agurs test for materiality of specifically re-
quested material must be made before the trial. 7 7 Because a court, after
trial, has to put itself in the shoes of the prosecutor, and speculate as to
whether disclosure would have led to other relevant evidence, how the
defense would have used the evidence, and whether appropriate use of
the undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial,
Judge Gibbons claimed that as a matter of law a substantial basis for
materiality exists when a specific request is made. 78 Thus, according to
Judge Gibbons, as a matter of law, a constitutional error exists and the
prosecution has the burden of proving that the error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
79
bewilderment at the fact that the Supreme Court only considered the Brady is-
sue, and not the erroneous jury instructions issue. Id. Pflaumer contended that
the Third Circuit had granted him a new trial based on an erroneous jury in-
struction and thus review of the Brady issue was unnecessary. Id. The prosecu-
tion, in a reply memorandum, stated that the Third Circuit's judgment applied
only to the conspiracy charge, and not to the substantive crimes. Id. Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court did not mention the jury instructions in its order, thus
leaving some room for confusion. Id. Judge Gibbons argued that the error in
the jury instruction mandated a new trial on all counts not just the conspiracy
counts, thus mooting the Brady issue. Id. at 1235-40 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
He addressed the Brady question because the majority opinion found the errone-
ous jury instruction to apply only to the conspiracy count and further spoke on
the Brady issue in light of Bagley. Id. at 1240 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
The dissent was also confused by the fact that the Court did not note any
difference between the test employed to determine materiality with respect to a
record from a bench trial situation such as Bagley, where the judge is familiar
with his own deliberations, and ajury trial such as Pflaumer, in which the judge is
prohibited from inquiring into the jury's deliberations. Id.
Finally, the dissent was confused by the fact that the Court had remanded
the case to the court of appeals for review of the materiality issue, but failed to
discuss the scope of that review at the appellate level. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1235
(Gibbons, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1240 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons restated his major-
ity opinion in Oxman, in which the Agurs test was the appropriate test for deter-
mining the materiality of undisclosed information. For a further discussion of
the Agurs test, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
77. 774 F.2d at 1241 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). The rationale behind judge
Gibbons' prospective analysis is to avoid placing the prosecution in the position
of choosing whether to disclose the requested information, and possibly reveal
trial tactics, or to not disclose and hope to succeed in post-trial litigation on the
issue of materiality. Id. According to Judge Gibbons, by requiring the determi-
nation to be made as if the trial had not yet taken place, more prudent decisions
will be made concerning proper disclosure. Id.
78. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1310). Under
this analysis, since a prosecutor will have no way of determining before trial how
material a specific piece of evidence is, it will be deemed to be material as a
matter of law, and failure to disclose will be a constitutional error subject to
harmless error review. Id.
79. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons cited Chapman v. Califor-
[Vol. 31: p. 11421154
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Judge Gibbons recognized that the Bagley decision changed the
rules which measure materiality for purposes of determining the exist-
ence of a due process violation which warrants a new trial.80 However,
Judge Gibbons found that if Bagley was interpreted properly, the result
in Pflaumer should remain unchanged. 8 1
Judge Gibbons found no difficulty with the part of Bagley which re-
jected any distinction between impeachment evidence and any other
type of exculpatory evidence, 82 since the Third Circuit had never ap-
plied that distinction. 8 3 Further, Judge Gibbons stated that the proper
interpretation of that portion of the Bagley opinion was merely that there
could be no per se rule of granting a new trial in failure to disclose cases,
and all such cases are subject to the harmless error analysis. 84
The more significant part of Judge Gibbons' dissent was his inter-
pretation of the Bagley formula for determining materiality, which the
Supreme Court indicated was "whether there is a reasonable probability
that, had the [evidence] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
trial would have been different."'8 5 Judge Gibbons found it very signifi-
cant that the majority in Bagley determined it to be the job of the review-
ing court, and not the court who tried the case, to apply the new
materiality test.8 6 Judge Gibbons interpreted the above propositions to
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1969), as the leading authority for the harmless error standard.
Under Chapman, a constitutional error exists if the prosecution fails to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that absent the error, the outcome of the case would
have been unchanged. 386 U.S. at 24.
80. 774 F.2d at 1242 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1245 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
82. See Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3379. The Ninth Circuit had granted Bagley a
new trial, holding that failure to disclose specifically requested impeachment evi-
dence warranted an automatic reversal. Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462,
1464 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375
(1985). The Supreme Court rejected such a distinction, stating that the consti-
tutional error was not the fact that the defense did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, rather the error was based on the "Government's
failure to assist the defense by disclosing information that might have been help-
ful in conducting the cross examination." Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3381. The Court
went on to say that there is such a constitutional error only if the failure to dis-
close was material. Id.
83. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1242 n.4 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
84. Id. This reasoning is consistent with the majority opinion that Judge
Gibbons wrote when the Third Circuit previously reviewed this case. In Oxman,
the majority first determined whether the failure to disclose was material, and
then whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Oxman, 740
F.2d at 1298. For a further discussion of the holding of the Third Circuit in its
initial review of this case, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
85. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1242 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing Bagley, 105 S.
Ct. at 3385 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). The
Bagley opinion further stated that the reviewing court, in applying this formula,
may consider the effect of nondisclosure upon the defense's case, as well as the
difficulty of determining how the trial would have come out. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at
3384.
86. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1243 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
1986] 1155
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/11
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
mean that the Bagley decision merged the materiality of undisclosed evi-
dence test with the harmless error test (for determining whether consti-
tutional errors warrant a new trial). 87 Therefore, one test remained, the
standard being whether there is a reasonable probability that the ab-
sence of the error would have changed the outcome of the
proceeding. 88
Having established the parameters of the test to be applied in deter-
mining whether there should be a new trial based on the prosecution's
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, Judge Gibbons turned to the
question of which party has the burden of persuading the reviewing
court that the error was or was not material. 8 9 Noting that the Bagley
case was silent on this issue, Judge Gibbons relied on the allocation of
the burden of proof under the constitutional harmless error test and
stated: "I cannot read from the Justices' silence on intent to change the
settled law, which required that the government satisfy the reviewing court
that, had the prosecutor disclosed the evidence before trial, the trial's
outcome would not have been different." 90
Judge Gibbons then found it relatively easy to apply the facts of
Pflaumer to his interpretation of Bagley.9 1 He cogently determined that
the prosecution did not satisfy its burden in proving that, even had the
agreement with Ralph Wille been disclosed to the defense, there was a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been the same. 92
He emphasized that the case against Pflaumer rested heavily on the testi-
mony of Frank Jock, John Luciano, and Ralph Wille. 93 There was proof
87. Id.
88. Id. Judge Gibbons then determined that there is little or no practical
difference between the test for determining harmless error and the Bagley stan-
dard that it be reasonably probable that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different. Id. "In all cases in which such formulae are used .. .the
outcome will usually turn upon which party must bear those risks inherent in
speculation .... Id. For a discussion of the harmless error standard, see supra
note 75 and accompanying text.
89. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1243 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). This is especially
significant to Judge Gibbons because the party who bears the risk of nonpersua-
sion will most likely lose the argument, since "that party must bear those risks
inherent in speculation as to what may have gone on in the decisional process
had the script been presented to the factfinder differently." Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Gibbons' opinion that the existing rule
which places the burden of persuasion on the government should be retained
was set out in the Third Circuit's initial review of this case in the majority opin-
ion written by Judge Gibbons. See Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1298.
91. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1244 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
92. Id. Judge Gibbons argued that Ralph Wille's testimony was very signifi-
cant, since it was the only testimony which showed Pflaumer's day-to-day in-
volvement in the activities of WHP. Id. Further, Wille was not cross-examined
for impeachment purposes, which, if done with knowledge of his agreement,
may have undermined the jury's confidence in his testimony. Id. From these
facts, Judge Gibbons was not convinced that there was a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been the same. Id.
93. Id. at 1244-45 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of tes-
[Vol. 31: p. 11421156
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of agreements affecting the veracity ofJock's and Luciano's testimony. 94
According to Gibbons, the ability to impeach Wille "could well have un-
dermined the juror's confidence in the prosecution's case." 9 5 He thus
concluded that William Pflaumer was entitled to a new trial.9 6
Notwithstanding his interpretation of the new standard of material-
ity, Judge Gibbons concluded his dissent with a discussion of its ineffec-
tiveness. 9 7 Judge Gibbons argued that such a standard encourages
prosecutorial misconduct by allowing prosecutors "to decide for them-
selves whether nondisclosure of requested information will produce a
reasonable probability of a different result." 98
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bagley produced a
significant enough change in the interpretation of materiality to per-
suade District Judge Mencer, sitting by designation, that the govern-
ment's immunity agreement with Ralph Wille, and its subsequent failure
to disclose that agreement to the defense, was not heinous enough to
afford William H. Pflaumer a new trial on 21 counts of mail fraud. 99
The Bagley decision stands for two important propositions with re-
gard to prosecutorial disclosure of evidence to the defense. First, the
Court resolved any disagreement among the circuits with regard to how
to address a Brady material issue involving undisclosed impeachment ev-
idence. 100 The Court declared that for purposes of determining materi-
timony of Jock, Luciano, and Wille, see supra notes 29-34 and accompanying
text.
94. 774 F.2d at 1244-45 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1244 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Gibbons contended that Wille's
testimony was very significant in that it established that Pflaumer was involved in
the day-to-day activities of WHP. Id.
96. Id. at 1245 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). It should be emphasized that
Judge Gibbons believed that Pflaumer was entitled to a new trial on the basis of
erroneous jury instructions. Notwithstanding this contention, Gibbons also be-
lieved that Pflaumer deserved a new trial on the basis of the Brady issue.
97. Id. at 1244-45 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Gibbons argued that the Bagley
decision increased the risk of nondisclosure of material evidence in three ways.
First, it rendered the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ineffective because
prosecutors brought before the disciplinary board for failure to disclose can ar-
gue that they believed that disclosure would not produce a reasonable
probability of a changed verdict; second, the standard moved judicial determina-
tion of materiality from the pretrial stage to the post-trial stage; and third, the
new standard compounded the difficulties and confusion ofjudges on courts of
appeals. Id. at 1245 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1224. Judges Sloviter and Gibbons maintained
their "pre-Bagley" conclusions as to the materiality of the undisclosed immunity
agreement. Only Judge Mencer, the third judge on the panel in this case,
changed his opinion after reconsideration in light of the Bagley case. This was
enough to sway the balance of the court in the Pflaumer decision. Unfortunately,
Judge Mencer did not write an opinion in either case, thus the reason for his
change is left to speculation.
100. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3381. The Ninth Circuit determined that im-
peachment evidence is "even more egregious" than other exculpatory evidence,
1986] 1157
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ality, there is no difference between impeachment evidence and any
other exculpatory evidence.' 0 1
The second important aspect of the Bagley opinion is its attempt to
establish a uniform test for determining materiality. 10 2 The Bagley
Court held that undisclosed information is material if there is a reason-
able probability that the outcome of the proceeding would be different
had the evidence been disclosed.103
It is submitted that Bagley does not significantly change the law in
the Third Circuit pertaining to specifically requested exculpatory mate-
rial. While the analysis for defining materiality was set forth correctly by
Judge Sloviter's opinion in Pflaumer, 10 4 a proper application of this anal-
ysis to the facts of the present case could have plausibly resulted in the
outcome Judge Gibbons argued for-namely, a new trial for defendant
Pflaumer on the mail fraud convictions. 10 5
In 1976, the Supreme Court attempted to define the standard of
materiality used to determine a violation of the Brady doctrine.' 0 6 In
and failure to disclose this evidence warrants an "automatic reversal." Bagley v.
Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court vacated
that decision, holding that there is no distinction between impeachment evi-
dence and other exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3381.
It is interesting to note that prior to the Oxman case, the Third Circuit had
dealt with impeachment evidence and found it to be equally egregious to other
exculpatory evidence, and in some situations less egregious than exculpatory evi-
dence. See, e.g., United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204, 205 (3d Cir. 1976)(expressing some doubt as to application of the Agurs materiality standard, since
the concern in McCrane was over impeachment evidence).
It is suggested that the Court's remand of Pflaumer without opinion back to
the Third Circuit for reconsideration in light of Bagley was partially due to the
Oxman court's apparent preferential treatment of impeachment evidence. See
Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1313-14. While denying any per se materiality rule for im-
peachment evidence, the Oxman majority clearly gave impeachment evidence
preferential treatment in stating:
when the government has evidence in its files that serves to impeach a
prosecution witness, and when, as here, a specific request for that evi-
dence is made, then due process requires the government to disclose
the evidence if, viewed prospectively, the witness incriminates the de-
fendant at trial and the impeaching evidence significantly impairs the
incriminatory quality of the testimony.
Id. at 1313 (footnote omitted).
101. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3381. It is suggested that perhaps one of the reasons
that Judge Gibbons' opinion lost the majority position subsequent to Bagley was
that he could no longer rely upon the distinction between impeachment and
other exculpatory evidence.
102. Id. For a comparison of this uniform test with the previous standard
set out in Agurs, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 3383-84.
104. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
106. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 97. The Court broke down undisclosed informa-
tion into three separate situations: situations in which the prosecutor knew or
should have known that a witness gave perjured testimony; situations in which
the defense made no request or merely a general request for information, and
17
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United States v. Agurs, although no request for information was made, 10 7
the Court reviewed situations in which the defense made a specific re-
quest for information.' 0 8 The opinion suggests that the Court intended
for the defense to have a lesser burden in proving materiality in cases in
which a specific request for information has been made, compared to the
burden of the defense when no request is made. 10 9 In determining the
impact of Bagley on the Third Circuit, however, it is important to under-
stand how the Third Circuit subsequently applied the "standard" set out
by the Agurs decision.
United States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler" succinctly expressed the
Third Circuit's application of the Agurs test for specifically requested in-
formation.I1I In Gengler, the court determined the Agurs test for specific
requests was "whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the
outcome of the trial." 1 2 The court then determined that the nondis-
closed evidence must be viewed in light of evidence "adduced at
trial,"'113 not in a vacuum but "in terms of the total record in a particular
the prosecutor failed to disclose; and finally, situations in which the defense spe-
cifically requested information from the prosecutor. Id. at 103-07. In the first
category, the Agurs Court held that the undisclosed knowledge is material if
"there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of thejury." Id. at 103. In the situation in which defense counsel
made a general request, or no request at all, the information is material if it
creates a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. Id. at 112-13 (empha-
sis added). In the third situation, where the defense makes a specific request for
information, and the prosecutor fails to disclose, the test for determining
whether such information is material is unclear. The opinion suggests that in
such circumstances, if the undisclosed evidence might have affected the outcome
of the trial, the information is material. Id. at 106.
107. Id. at 103.
108. Id. at 106. Since the facts of Agurs do not entail a specific request by
defense counsel, any discussion of standards of materiality for situations in
which a specific request was made is arguably dicta.
109. Id. Initially, the opinion noted that the Brady case was a specific re-
quest case, and that the materiality standard in the case was whether the evi-
dence "might have affected the outcome of the trial." Id. at 104. However, the
Agurs Court later noted that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose specifically re-
quested material "if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists .. " Id. at
106. Failure to do so "is seldom, if ever, excusable." Id.
The Agurs case has been regarded as "pro-prosecution" in no request situa-
tions due to the relatively strict materiality standard. See Babcock, supra note 2,
at 1175-82. However, the dicta in Agurs pertaining to specific request situations
has also been interpreted as an expansion of the prosecution's duty to disclose.
See Note, The Prosecutor's Dilemma-A Duty to Disclose or a Duty Not to Commit Revers-
ible Error, 40 LA. L. REV. 513, 517-19 (1980); see also Comment, White Collar Crime:
Second Annual Survey of the Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 217-20 (1981).
110. 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978). In Gengler, the defendant was convicted
of counterfeiting. Id. at 732. He appealed on the ground that specifically re-
quested impeachment evidence was withheld from the defense, and that this
constituted a Brady violation, mandating a new trial. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 736 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104).
113. Id.
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case."
1 14
According to the language in Gengler, a reviewing court will deter-
mine the materiality of the nondisclosed evidence retrospectively in
terms of its impact in connection with all other evidence introduced at
trial."t 5 Although the outcome of the test differed with each case, de-
pending on the particular facts before the court, the method was consist-
ently applied until Oxman." I 6
It is submitted that the majority in Oxman ignored Third Circuit pre-
cedent pertaining to specific request cases. Instead of focusing on the
trial court's entire record in order to determine whether the undisclosed
evidence might have changed the jury's verdict, the court determined
that the duty of the prosecutor is the crux of the materiality test." 7 It is
submitted further that this interpretation of Agurs applying a prospective
analysis, focusing upon the duty of the prosecutor, was contrary to the
spirit of the Brady doctrine. The Brady doctrine focuses on the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial as opposed to concern over punishing the mis-
behavior of the prosecution in failing to disclose information to defense
counsel. 118
It is suggested that the dissenting opinion by Judge Sloviter in
Oxman, attacking the prospective analysis and the conclusion reached by
application of that analysis, is correct in light of the Third Circuit prece-
114. Id. The Gengler court reasoned that:
In some instances, relatively minor facts that are withheld from a de-
fendant may be enough to justify vacating a conviction, if the undis-
closed information directly casts doubt on the evidence presented to
the jury and on which the jury relied in its finding of guilt. On the
other hand, unrevealed evidence which by itself may seem more excul-
patory than that justifying a new trial in another case may nevertheless
not be considered material in a case where other evidence before the
jury removes any doubts about the question of guilt.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
115. This can be inferred from the court's language pertaining to a review-
ing court's guidelines in determining materiality. See supra notes 103-107 and
accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1983) (no
denial of due process if disclosed in time for effective use at trial), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1048 (1984); DeMartino v. Weidenburner, 616 F.2d 708, 713 (3d Cir.
1980) (undisclosed statements that money was meant to retain counsel and not
to be used as bribe is immaterial, since record shows corroborating testimony);
United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that undisclosed
evidence creates substantial basis for claiming materiality, thus ordering new
trial).
117. 740 F.2d at 1313. In Oxman, the Third Circuit stated:
[w]e reject the government's invitation to speculate on whether or not,
... trial counsel might have impeached the witness in question. The
test for Brady material must be capable of application by the prosecutor
before trial, and ... the prosecutor, before trial ... [is not] capable of
speculating on the ... manner and degree of impeachment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
118. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104 n.10; see also Babcock, supra note 2 at 1175-
1160 [Vol. 31: p. 1142
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dent. 19 Judge Gibbons in Oxman argued that the defendant's right to a
fair trial is protected through the application of the harmless error test
once materiality has been determined. 120 Under this approach, a new
trial is not required even if the undisclosed evidence is material, where
the prosecutor can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitu-
tional error (in failing to disclose material information) was harmless in
relation to the outcome of the trial. 12 1 As Judge Sloviter's dissent in
Oxman pointed out, however, determining materiality on a prospective
basis in effect makes all impeachment evidence material. 12 2 This inter-
pretation combined with the subsequent application of the harmless er-
ror test, therefore, makes the determination of a violation of the Brady
doctrine a standard more favorable to the defense than that standard
contemplated by either Agurs or the Third Circuit cases which applied
Agurs prior to the Oxman decision. 123 Because the harmless error burden
is a very difficult burden for the prosecution to overcome, 124 the effect
119. For a discussion and analysis of Third Circuit precedent in terms of
that court's application of the materiality standard established in Agurs, see supra
note 109 and accompanying text.
120. See Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1317. The majority opinion claimed that the
application of the harmless error standard places an appropriate proportion of
the emphasis of disclosure rules upon the assurance of the defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial. Id.
121. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1969). The Court in Chap-
man held that some constitutional errors are so insignificant that an automatic
reversal of the conviction is not required. Id. at 22. The Court then established
a standard for determining when such an insignificant error exists. Id. at 22-23.
The Chapman Court determined that a constitutional error does not require a
new trial if the party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless. Id. at 24.
For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the Chapman harmless
error rule to the facts of Oxman, see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
122. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1321 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
The harmless error standard, however, is arguably not strict enough to pro-
mote the adversarial nature of a criminal trial, because if this were the ultimate
burden, the prosecutor's duty to disclose would be so broad as to effectively turn
the trial away from its adversarial objectives. As the Supreme Court said in
Agurs:
The Court of Appeals appears to have assumed that the prosecutor
has a constitutional obligation to disclose any information that might
affect the jury's verdict. That statement of a constitutional standard of
materiality approaches the "sporting theory ofjustice" which the Court
expressly rejected in Brady. For a jury's appraisal of a case "might" be
affected by an improper or trivial consideration as well as by evidence
giving rise to a legitimate doubt on the issue of guilt. If everything that
might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor
could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete dis-
covery of his files as a matter of routine practice .... [T]he Constitu-
tion surely does not demand that much.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108-09.
123. See Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1320-21 (Sloviter,J., dissenting) (arguing Third
Circuit standard for materiality of specifically requested material is whether un-
disclosed information might affect outcome of trial).
124. See Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1321 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter
1986] 1161
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of the standard suggested by the Oxman majority would be to grant the
defendant a new trial for nondisclosure of virtually any information
which could arguably impeach a government witness.125 It is suggested
that this result is inconsistent with the spirit of Agurs and Brady, as it
evidences little regard for the effect of that information on the outcome
of the trial.
Although, on its face, the Bagley test makes it more difficult for the
defense to get a new trial than it was under Agurs, 12 6 language in the
remainder of the Bagley opinion arguably lessens the severity of the uni-
form test with respect to the defendant in specific request cases. 12 7
Even though the Court refuses to adopt the government's suggestion to
impose a more pro-defendant materiality standard in specific request sit-
uations,1 28 the Court does outline a plan of application for appellate
courts to follow. 12 9 The Court acknowledges a possible adverse effect
upon the adversarial process, but follows by directing a reviewing court
applying the Bagley standard to "consider directly any adverse effect that
the prosecution's failure to respond might have had on the preparation
or presentation of the defendant's case."' 3 0 Further, according to the
Supreme Court, the reviewing court must evaluate any effect of nondis-
closure of evidence upon the defense in "light of the totality of the cir-
cumstances," and in light of the inherent difficulty of reconstructing in a
post-trial setting the course the defense at trial would have taken had the
characterized the harmless error standard as "stringent." Id. The dissent fur-
ther equates the harmless error standard with the materiality standard the Agurs
Court established for perjured testimony. Id. That standard requires a new trial
if disclosure of the perjured testimony "could have" affected the jury verdict.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103. At least one other circuit has determined the harmless
error standard to be similar to the perjured testimony materiality standard set
out inAgurs. See United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981).
125. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1321 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
126. Compare Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3384 (information is material if there is
reasonable probability that disclosure would change outcome of proceeding)
with Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104-06 (specifically requested information is material if its
existence might have changed outcome of trial). However, in a situation in
which no request or a general request was made for the undisclosed informa-
tion, the Agurs test for materiality is unchanged.
Compare Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3383-84 (information is material if there is rea-
sonable probability that disclosure would change outcome of proceeding) with
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13 ("if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed"). For a
discussion of the holding in Agurs with regard to specifically requested informa-
tion, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
127. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3383-84.
128. Id. at 3384.
129. Id. The Court suggested that the more specific the request, the more
reasonable it is for the defense to assume that evidence does not exist if it is not
disclosed. Id. Thus, a specific request case impairs pretrial and trial decisions as
well as the effectiveness of the adversary system. Id.
130. Id.
1162
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evidence been properly disclosed. 13 ' It is submitted that the guidelines
set out by the Court for applying the new materiality standard signifi-
cantly diminish the severity of that test with respect to the defendant's
burden of proof, and thus narrows the apparent gap between Bagley and
the Third Circuit's post-Agurs materiality determination.13 2
In Pflaumer, Judge Sloviter reasoned first, that the Bagley standard
defined materiality more restrictively than the Agurs test, and second,
that the facts in Pflaumer did not require a new trial under this stricter
test. It is submitted that the Agurs test as interpreted by the Third Cir-
cuit, and the Bagley test including the guidelines for applying the test,
are not as different as perceived by the majority in Pflaumer. A reason-
able application of this "new" test to the facts of Pflaumer does not nec-
essarily warrant a reversal in the decision. The facts of Pflaumer could be
construed to show that the Wille testimony was the only testimony which
showed that Pflaumer was involved in the daily business operations of
WHP, and were his testimony found uncredible by the jury, there would
have been no substantial link between the scheme and William
Pflaumer. 133 Further, Ralph Wille was the only significant government
witness whose credibility was not tested.' 3 4 Thus, one could reasonably
131. Id. The dissenting opinion in Pflaumer found it significant that the
Court in Bagley made continual references to the role of the appellate court in
the materiality determination. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1235 (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing). The Pflaumer dissent found this particularly significant in light of the fact
that the trial court had coincidentally applied a test of materiality very similar to
the one established in Bagley, thus obviating the need to further examine
whether extreme deference by an appellate court to the trial court's determina-
tion was essential. Id.
132. Although it is possible to create a distinction between evidence that
might affect the outcome of a proceeding, and the Bagley standard which gives
rise to a reasonable probability that its inclusion would affect the outcome of a
proceeding, the supplementary language in Bagley narrows the gap between the
two standards. This is especially true injury trials when ajudge is not permitted
to delve into the jury deliberations in order to determine which evidence influ-
enced its findings. See FED. R. EvID. 606(b) (judge prohibited from inquiring
into jury's deliberative process).
Judge Gibbons' dissent in Pflaumer saw this as a significant distinguishing
factor between Pflaumer and Bagley. Bagley was a bench trial which allowed the
judge to recall and evaluate his own deliberative process, while Pflaumer was a
jury trial. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1235 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
133. For a further discussion of the facts of Pflaumer, and the significance of
Ralph Wille's testimony, see supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
The Pflaumer dissent reached a decision favorable to the defendant, and
raised some interesting distinguishing factors between Bagley and Pflaumer. For a
discussion ofJudge Gibbons' list of factors that distinguish Pflaumer from Bagley,
see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
It is submitted, however, that this opinion also misconstrued the spirit of
Bagley, and abandoned prior Third Circuit precedent. Judge Gibbons acknowl-
edged in the dissent that the prospective analysis which he had applied in the
Oxman case was no longer a viable test, in light of Bagley. See Pflaumer, 774 F.2d
at 1243 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
134. Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1315-16.
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infer from the record that, had the evidence of Ralph Wille's immunity
agreement been disclosed, he would have been vigorously impeached by
the defense, destroying a key link between the scheme and Pflaumer,
thus sufficiently undermining the confidence of the outcome of the trial.
It is clear that when reviewing the record in its entirety, and examin-
ing the trial court's reasoning behind a denial of a motion for a new trial
on the Brady issue, reasonable minds could differ as to the materiality of
a specific piece of evidence. Thus, it is submitted that since Judge
Sloviter appropriately applied the Agurs test in her dissent in Oxman and
determined Wille's testimony not to be material under that test, even
though the Bagley case does not significantly alter the test for materiality,
Judge Sloviter's majority opinion in Pflaumer reached a conclusion con-
sistent with her opinion in Oxman. 13 5
It is submitted that the Pflaumer dissent misconstrued the spirit of
Bagley and abandoned prior Third Circuit precedent. Judge Gibbons ac-
knowledged in the dissent that the prospective analysis which he had
applied in Oxman was no longer a viable test in light of Bagley. 136 While
Judge Gibbons made no reference to his prospective materiality analysis
in the dissent, his opinion addressed Judge Sloviter's apparent desire in
the Oxman opinion to merge the harmless error standard with the mate-
riality standard.13 7  Judge Gibbons acknowledged that Bagley did
"merge the standard of materiality.., into the standard of review, which
under Agurs was whether.., the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 138 If the standard of review becomes one of analysis similar to
the harmless error test, prospective analysis is not possible.
Instead of arguing that the Bagley test, and its subsequent language,
did not significantly change the specific request cases, Judge Gibbons
relied solely on his own precedent in the Oxman case. 139 Judge Gibbons
stated that the defense does not have the burden of persuasion to estab-
lish the Bagley materiality standard, and thus the prosecutor carries the
risk of nonpersuasion."40 Judge Gibbons' argument that the risk of non-
persuasion is upon the party benefiting from the constitutional error is
based upon the Court's determination in California v. Chapman that the
prosecution has the burden of proving that the constitutional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,' 4' and his assertion is that the
Bagley opinion is silent as to the allocation of this burden. 14 2
135. For a discussion of Judge Sloviter's dissenting opinion in Oxman, see
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
136. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1240-45 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1241 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1243 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (quoting Oxman for support for proposition that burden for prov-
ing materiality should be on prosecution, or benefiting party).
140. Id.
141. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1969).
142. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1243 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
1164 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1142
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It is submitted that the primary difficulty with this analysis is the
underlying assumption that Bagley merged the materiality test and the
harmless error test. The harmless error test is only applied once a con-
stitutional error has been established. 14 3 Thus, the prosecuting party
has an opportunity to overcome the effect of the unconstitutional con-
duct in a new trial, by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the con-
stitutional error was harmless. The fact that the Bagley materiality test
encompasses the harmless error test, and that it would be now virtually
impossible to find undisclosed evidence material and harmless does not
have the effect of switching the burden to the prosecution. 1
44
The dissent is primarily concerned with the effect the Bagley deci-
sion will have on the adversary process due to the prosecution's new
disincentive to disclose evidence to requesting defense lawyers. 14 5
While this appears to be true from the Pflaumer majority, it is submitted
that it can still be soundly and successfully argued that the Bagley case
does not significantly change the Third Circuit's precedent in determin-
ing the materiality of undisclosed specifically requested information.
Robert E. Schwartz
143. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (holding that all constitutional errors do
not warrant automatic new trial, only those in which error was not harmless).
144. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 525 (3d ed. 1984). The
general rule is that the burden of proof falls upon the moving party. Id. McCor-
mick notes that in cases in which the defense seeks to have evidence excluded on
grounds that it was unconstitutionally obtained, the burden is generally upon
the defense to prove the unconstitutionality of the evidence-obtaining conduct.
Id.; see also Babcock, supra note 2, at 1147-48 (Agurs court places burden of prov-
ing materiality "unequivocally on the defense").
145. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d at 1245 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see Bagley, 105 S.
Ct. at 3384. For a further discussion of this portion of the Gibbons' dissent, see
supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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